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Collective Bargaining By Salaried 
Professionals 
George W. Adams 
This paper examines whether the traditional approach 
to collective bargaining fit s the needs of the salaried profes-
sionals or if spécial treatment is necessary. 
Récent législative initiatives in many Canadian jurisdictions sug-
gest a growing récognition that the salaried members of many of the 
prototype1 or traditional professions are subject to the same social and 
économie forces confronting other employées. Thèse initiatives hâve 
granted salaried members of one or more professions access to collec-
tive bargaining and in doing so hâve generally accorded them spécial 
bargaining unit treatment. Because the forces that hâve caused salaried 
professionals to turn to collective bargaining are accelerating, other 
jurisdictions will move in the same direction and many of the current 
initiatives are likely to be broadened. The number of employed profes-
sionals is steadily, in fact, dramatically increasing and many of the 
large bureacracies in which they tend to be employed do not readily 
and voluntarily adjust to the culture of professionalism. As a gênerai 
matter professional associations hâve not been able to respond to the 
employment problems experienced by their salaried membership and 
thus thèse professionals hâve had no alternative but to turn to collec-
tive bargaining. The first part of this paper surveys the employment 
problems of salaried professionals that hâve given rise to thèse develop-
ments. 
However thèse employment problems are not unique to the proto-
type professions but rather are common to a growing number of intellec-
tual occupations with whom the pro-
totype professionals often work side 
by side. This increasing number 
of intellectual workers and their 
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1
 By prototype I mean the architectural, dental, légal, médical, and engineering 
professions. 
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«professionalization» therefore raises doubts about the appropriateness 
— in fact fairness — of singling out the salaried members of the proto-
type professions for spécial treatment in collective bargaining statutes 
of gênerai application. For example, in a number of jurisdictions récent 
amendments apply only to salaried members of particular professions 
and mandate craft bargaining units for them — bargaining units restrict-
ed to thèse individual professions. What is the justification for giving 
thèse particular occupations craft status and is it a désirable policy? 
How should législatures and labour boards respond to claims for similar 
treatment by members of the growing number of intellectual occupations 
that possess many if not ail of the important hallmarks of «profes-
sionalism» ? Quite clearly a similar approach with respect to them could 
lead to an unworkable fragmentation of bargaining units. But does it 
then follow that no spécial treatment ought to be accorded to any in-
tellectual occupation whether it is part of a prototype profession or 
not? In seeking to address this question the paper is critical of most 
of the approaches adopted in Canada to date but concludes that spécial 
treatment along the lines taken in the United States is both necessary 
and practical. 
SALARIED PROFESSIONALS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: SOME HISTORY 
While législation in Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, Alberta and 
Prince Edward Island exclude ail of the prototype professions from col-
lective bargaining by providing that the définition of «employée» does 
not include «a member of the médical, dental, architectural, engineer-
ing, or légal profession, qualified to practise under the laws of a province 
and employed in that capacity», the earliest Canadian labour laws did 
not do so. However after a very short and unsatisfactory expérience 
Parliament decided against their inclusion and most jurisdictions, save 
for Saskatchewan, followed suit. The principal reasons for exclusion can 
be briefly summarized. First, because early labour laws made no réf-
érence to professionals they were often «swept» into large heteroge-
neous bargaining units containing other employées to whom they could 
not relate. For example, in British Columbia Distillery Co. Ltd. and 
Local 203 United Office and Professional Workers of America, Local 
203 et al Wartime L.R.B.2, the Board ruled: 
The conditions of employment of the office workers and the professional 
and technical workers employed by the employer are the same. No good 
1947 CLLC para. 10, 513 (Wartime Labour Relations Board) 
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reason has been shown to, warrant subdividing this group of employées 
into separate units. 
A similar response to a particular working relationship that continues 
as a problem today is revealed in Québec Fédération of Professional 
Employées in Applied Science and Research, Unit 4, and Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation, Wartime, C.L.R.B.,3 in which the Wartime 
Board stated: 
The Board does not consider that for the purpose of collective bargaining 
there is any important différence in interest between a professionally 
qualified engineer and an engineer who has no such professional qualifica-
tions, provided both are carrying on work of the same or similar nature 
and under similar conditions. Académie attainment cannot by itself détermine 
the community of interest. 
Secondly, collective bargaining by professionals was thought by many 
to be unethical or at least undignified. The prototype professions are, 
generally speaking, service oriented and ail hâve been granted a sta-
tutory monopoly over the provision of their services. Therefore because 
collective bargaining could resuit in the concerted withholding of thèse 
services, abstract ethical and public policy questions were perceived. 
Moreover, this réticence was compounded by the fact that the profes-
sions had attracted persons into their membership who were very in-
dividualistic and in whom this individualism was reinforced by a service 
oriented professional training. From their viewpoint then collective 
action centering on monetary matters was not only unseemly but in 
direct conflict with a profession's principal purpose — serving the pub-
lic. Thirdly, professional associations were dominated by either non-
salaried professionals who lacked identification with the problems of 
their salaried colleagues or by salaried professionals who had either 
managerial responsibility or ambitions in this regard. Finally, it is 
likely that governments of the day were affected by a common feeling 
that professionals are already well served by their status in society. 
Even today, it is difficult for the gênerai public to identify with the 
employment problems related to professional occupations because of 
the obvious advantages enjoyed by the non-salaried faction of the pro-
fessions. 
FORCES OF CHANGE 
As fundamental technological and market forces had their impact 
on labour market structure and business form, thèse views began to be 
3
 1946 CLLC para. 10, 485 (Wartime Labour Relations Board) 
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reconsidered. While the increase in white-collar workers in relation 
to the total labour force was the most salient aspect of the overall 
occupational shift in the first half of this century, the growth of the 
«professional» group within this white-collar segment has been the 
most striking récent change. Between 1951 and 1971 professionals 
showed the largest percentage increase of any occupational classifica-
tion, rising in absolute numbers from 385,696 to 848,725, a gain of 
120.1% compared to a 114.2% increase in the white-collar work force 
and only 65.4% in ail occupational catégories.4 
Professor Bell believes thèse changes to be at the heart of what 
he calls «the post-industrial society». In describing this same occupa-
tional distribution in the United States he writes: 
The pre-eminence of the professional and technical class. 
The second way of defining a post-industrial society is through the change 
in occupational distributions; i.e. not only where people work but the kind 
of work they do. In large measure occupation is the most important déter-
minant of class and stratification in the society. 
The onset of industrialization created a new phenomenon, the semi-skilled 
worker who could be trained within a few weeks to do the simple routine 
opérations required in machine work. Within industrial societies, the semi-
skilled worker has been the single largest category in the labour force. The 
expansion of the service economy, with its emphasis on office work, éduca-
tion and government, has naturally brought about a shift to white-collar 
occupations. In the United States, by 1956 the number of white-collar work-
ers for the first time in the history of industrial civilization outnumbered 
the blue-collar workers in the occupational structure. Since then the ratio 
has been widening steadily; by 1970 the white-collar workers outnumbered 
the blue-collar by more than five to four. 
But the most startling change has been the growth of professional and 
technical employment — jobs that usually require some collège éducation — 
at a rate twice that of the average. In 1940 there were 3.9 million such 
persons in the society; by 1964 the number had risen to 8.6 million and it 
is estimated that by 1975 there will be 13.2 million professional and technical 
persons, making it the second largest of the eight occupational divisions 
in the country, exceeded only by the semi-skilled workers. One further 
statistical breakdown will round out the picture — the rôle of the scientists 
and engineers who form the key group in the post-industrial society. While 
the growth rate of the professional and technical class as a whole has been 
twice that of the average labour force, the growth rate of the scientists 
and engineers has been triple that of the working population. By 1975 the 
United States may hâve about 550,000 scientists (natural and social sci-
4
 GOLDENBERG, Shirley B., Professional Workers and Collective Bargain-
ing, Task Force on Labour Relations (1968) p. 14 & 15 and 1971 Census of Canada, 
Statistics Canada, Catalogue 94-717. 
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entists) as against 275,000 in 1960, and almost a million and a half engineers 
compared to 800,000 in i960.5 
But it is also important to note another and related feature of 
«the post-industrial society». Despite the image of individualism trad-
itionally associated with professional work, almost ail teachers and 
nurses are paid employées as are 96% of engineers and architects, 97% 
of economists, and 93% of accountants and auditors.6 Even in the most 
traditionally individualistic professions of law and medicine, approxi-
mately 43% are not engaged in private practice.7 Almost ail of the 
«new professionals», ranging from social workers to Systems analysts, 
work for an employer. And salaried professionals tend to be concentrat-
ed in large work organizations that may not easily adapt to the culture 
of professionalism.8 
Quite clearly thèse occupational shifts will continue at an even 
more rapid rate in the décade ahead. The growing emphasis in man-
power requirements will be upon relatively high degrees of skill, know-
ledge and specialized training of various kinds. The shift from an agricul-
tural economy to a predominantly urban industrial society has brought 
with it the need to concentrate large amounts of capital and numbers 
of people in order to meet the needs of an interdependent urban econ-
omy. The resuit has been an integrated economy comprised of large 
industrial, scientific and commercial bureaucracies housing the vast 
number of specialized white-collar employées needed to coordinate 
complex production and marketing activities. More recently, there 
has been a distinct trend towards a service oriented economy which 
has even accelerated thèse occupational shifts. As national incomes 
hâve risen there has been an increased demand for services and a cor-
respondis occupational shift to trade, finance, transport, health., récréa-
tion, research, éducation and government activities. Thèse airea rep-
resent the greatest expansion of intellectually based occupations. This 
occupational shift has also been magnified by the dramatic growth of 
scientific and technical knowledge and the corrélative rise of science 
based industries (computers, electronics, optics, polymers, health).9 The 
5
 BELL, The Corning of Post-lndustrial Society (1973) 15. 
6




 For example, by 1962, 54% of ail engineers and scientists in the United States 
worked in establishments employing 1,000 or more employées. (See Kleingartner, Profes-
sional Associations: An Alternative to Unions? in Woodworth and Peterson, Collective 
Bargaining for Public and Professional Employées (1969) p. 294). 
9
 Professor Bell argues that what is distinctive about this stage in our develop-
ment is the centrality of theoretical knowledge and its exponential growth. BELL, supra, 
p. 20. 
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end resuit has been a bureaucratization of the sciences and an increas-
ing specialization of intellectual work. Thèse features of contemporary 
society challenge the adequacy of our collective bargaining laws as well 
as any attempt to confine the term «professional» to the prototype 
professions. 
INTEREST OF SALARIED PROFESSIONALS IN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
Thèse background forces hâve contributed to the interest of 
salaried professional employées in the collective bargaining process be-
cause they mean that salaried professional employées are exposed to 
the same économie and social risks as other wage and salary earners. 
The bureaucratization of intellectual work and the explosion of 
knowledge not only in new fields but within existing fields has led to 
the specialization of intellectual work into minute parts. For example, 
after World War II, 54 specializations in the sciences were listed in 
the United States National Register of Scientific and Technical Per-
sonnel. Twenty years later there were over 900 distinct scientific and 
technical specializations listed.10 As this happens, skills are inevitably 
broken down, compartmentalized and routinized to the point where 
salaried professionals may be unable to realize the skills for which they 
were educated. This problem is often aggravated by the immédiate 
profit-making interests of an enterprise which cause it to employ its 
labour in the most efficient manner.11 It may be more efficient to hâve 
work which a professional considers to be within his profession's ex-
clusive jurisdiction performed by persons with a lesser but related 
éducation or at least to intersperse such persons amongst the profes-
sional employées. Similarly it may be more economical to require a 
salaried professional to perform work which a lesser educated but un-
available person, with training, could perform and thereby avoid im-
médiate recruitment and training costs. Salaried professionals may 
therefore turn to collective bargaining as a method of perserving or 
recovering what they believe to be an exclusive work jurisdiction. 
Another motivating factor may arise out of a désire to play a more 
significant or active rôle in the decision-making processes of the enter-
prise. An interest in direct participation in the decision-making of a 
firm is but a corollary of professional expertise. In this sensé, claims 
for greater involvement in decision-making are based upon the premise 
10
 See BELL, supra, p. 187. 
11
 See CHARTIER, The Management of Professional Employées (1968) 
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that those persons who hâve undertaken protracted studies or acquired 
expérience which give them a spécial ability to perform a given type 
of work, hâve the right to participate in décisions relating to that vvork 
and to share this decision-making power only with persons of at least 
equal compétence.12 However in a bureaucratie setting guided by 
managerial authority, salaried professionals may hâve no freedom to 
choose the direction of work and little or no control over the condi-
tions under which they must work. Indeed, salaried professionals may 
not be considered as real workers or their contribution may be cliscount-
ed because their efforts seldom resuit directly in a physical product and 
this only aggravâtes feelings of aliénation.13 The end resuit is that 
salaried professionals, having undergone a training that reinforces a 
strong sensé of compétence and autonomy, can find themselves distinct-
ly subordinate to, in their perception, an insensitive managerial author-
ity. 
But muffled claims for greater job control may not be the central 
concern. In many instances salaried professionals turn to collective 
bargaining simply for économie reasons. For example, employed profes-
sionals may be paid in accordance with the internai job hierarchy of a 
bureaucracy which has little or no relationship to professional status, 
but lack personal mobility to react to thèse « unacceptable » pay scales 
because their skills are spécifie to the enterprise or the similarity in 
salary scales between firms may make moving pointless. 
Financial considérations are very often the primary reason why 
intellectual workers paid from public funds opt for collective bargaining. 
In our so-called post-industrial society the government has become the 
single largest employer of intellectual workers, and indirectly, through 
public funding, supports the employment of many more. Thèse workers 
are caught up in one of to-day's most perplexing employment dilemmas 
— the search for an appropriate mechanism to set the terms and condi-
tions of employment of public employées or employées dépendent upon 
public funds. Winning wage increases from the government is a far 
différent matter than from private industry. The multiplication of gov-
ernment functions créâtes an unremitting need for new revenues and 
a concommitant public outery against rising taxes. Increasingly the end 
resuit has been a décision to end or limit existing programs and to hold 
12
 See GROSS, When Occupations Meei: Professions in Trouble, p. 45, Minnea-
polis, University of Minnesota (1967) 
13
 See CUVILLIER, Intellectual Workers and their Work in Social Theory 
and Practice (1974) Int ' l . Lab. Rev. 291 at 294. 
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down spending and this has had an adverse effect on wages and salaries. 
Indeed, one often gets the impression that the public expect intellectual 
workers who profess a dévotion to work and to public service to be 
indiffèrent to économie advantages. Buffetted by thèse political winds, 
many salaried professionals hâve simply been driven to collective action 
with public school teachers, university faculty and hospital employées 
being good cases in point. 
But why turn to collective bargaining? Why didn't salaried profes-
sionals turn to their professional associations for assistance ? The answer 
is that most did at first, and thèse professional associations were unable 
or unwilling to grapple with employment related problems, leaving no 
alternative to collective bargaining for the salaried professional. On 
the whole, professional associations hâve shied away from direct 
confrontation with employers. It has been suggested that the associa-
tions hâve a practitioner orientation and cannot identify with the 
problems confronting salaried members or that the associations are 
dominated by employer oriented members who are unsympathetic.14 
But whatever the reason professional associations by themselves were 
unable to respond to the problems of their salaried members and col-
lective bargaining was opted for by many. 
SOME RECENT LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES 
In15 Ontario the Législature has recently provided professional 
engineers with access to collective bargaining under The Ontario Labour 
Relations Act.16 Section 6(3) stipulâtes that «(a) bargaining unit consist-
ing solely of professional engineers shall be deemed by the Board to 
be a unit of employées appropriate for collective bargaining. » The Board 
may include engineers in a bargaining unit with other employées only 
if a majority of the engineers wish to be included — in short, profes-
sional engineers hâve been given a craft status in Ontario. New Bruns-
wick17 has taken this craft concept further by providing that the mem-
bers of the médical, dental, dietetic, architectural, engineering, and 
légal professions may engage in collective bargaining and each profes-
14
 For example, one study observed that a survey of over 3,000 engineers and 
scientists showed that 38 per cent of them were desirous of a future in administration, 
rather than in research or engineering. KLEINGARTNER, Professionalism and Salaried 
Worker Organization (1967) p. 80. 
15
 This review is limited to private sector labour législation. 
16
 R.S.O. 1970, c. 232 as amended by 1975, c. 76 
17
 Industrial Relations Act, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. 1-4, s. 1 (5) (b). 
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sion is entitled to a separate barbaining unit unless the members wish 
to hâve other employées included.18 
Another approach adopted by the Fédéral Government19 and 
Manitoba20 concentrâtes less on the prototype professions by defining 
a professional employée as « an employée who (i) is engaged in the ap-
plication of specialized knowledge ordinarily acquired by a course of 
institution and study resulting in graduation from a university or similar 
institution ; and (ii) is or is eligible to be a member of a professional 
organization that is authorized by statute to establish qualifications for 
membership in the organization. » 
Partnering this somewhat more expansive définition of a profes-
sional employée, the Fédéral Government has selected a more flexible 
approach to professional bargaining unit structures as well. Section 
125(3) of the Code reads: 
Where a trade union applies under section 124 for certification as the bar-
gaining agent for a unit comprised of or including professional employées, 
the Board, subject to subsection (2) 
(a) shall détermine that the unit appropriate for collective bargaining is a 
unit comprised of only professional employées, unless such a unit would 
not otherwise be appropriate for collective bargaining ; 
(b) may détermine that professional employées of more than one profes-
sion be included in the unit; and 
(c) may détermine that employées performing the functions but lacking the 
qualifications of a professional employée be included in the unit. 
and subsection 2 of section 125 provides: 
In determining whether a unit constitutes a unit that is appropriate for col-
lective bargaining, the Board may include any employées in or exclude any 
employées from the unit proposed by the trade union. 
Finally, neither the Labour Code of British Columbia2i nor the 
Saskatchewan Trade Union Act27 mentions the inclusion or exclusion 
18
 Québec follows this same approach essentially, although many more profes-
sions are included (advocates, notariés, physicians and surgeons, inspectors of anatomy, 
homéopathie physicians, pharmacists and druggists, dental surgeons, engineers, land sur-
veyors, architects, forestry engineers, optometrists and opticians, and dispensing opti-
cians). Labour Code R.S.Q. c. 141 as amended s.20. 
19
 Canada Labour Code R.S. C. 1970 c L-l, Part V, S.C. 1972, c. 18, 5, 107 
and s. 125 (3). 
20
 The Labour Relations Act, C C S . M . c L-10 enacted by S.M. 1972, c. 75, 
s. 1 (t) and s. 28 (3). See also Organization of Professional Engineers, etc., v. Manitoba 
Labour Relations Board (1976) W.W.R. 723 (Man. C.A.) 
26
 Labour Code of British Columbia S.B.C. 1973, c. 122 
22
 The Trade Union Act, 1972, S.S. 1972, c. 137 
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of professional employées and therefore they are subject to those sta-
tutes in the same manner as any other employée. This then represents 
a third approach. 
CHALLENGE FOR PUBLIC POLICY 
Ail salaried professionals should be able to engage in collective 
bargaining and this principle is gaining widespread acceptance. They 
face the same employment problems as others and therefore they ought 
to hâve the same rights as others in resolving thèse concerns. However 
the challenge for public policy relates to the way in which this resuit 
is to be effected. Are the prototype professions to be distinguished 
from other intellectual workers and provided with craft status as is the 
case in New Brunswick, or should the unwarranted exclusions simply 
be removed as in British Columbia and bargaining unit structures de-
termined by référence to the traditional principles underpinning the con-
cept of « appropriateness » ? On the other hand, the Canada Labour 
Code and the Manitoba Labour Relations Act adopt positions some-
where in between thèse two extrêmes. 
Who is a professional? 
What is the rationale for limiting professional employée définitions 
to the prototype professions? While they can be distinguished from 
other employées because their non-salaried brethren achieved exclusive 
authority to regulate «the practising profession», should the existence 
of licensing, registration and certification statutes be relevant to the 
granting of a spécial status to thèse occupations under modem labour 
laws. Generally thèse statutes were enacted to protect an inexpert public 
from the unqualified or unscrupulous practitioner. However where the 
consumer is a small number of sophisticated employers of where the 
occupation does not consult or practise with respect to a broadly based 
lay clientèle, licensing statutes are less relevant and indeed less likely 
to exist. For example, Friedson has observed that «licensing is much 
less likely to occur on behalf of the scholar or the scientist, for they 
are devoted to exploring intellectual Systems primarily for the eyes of 
their colleagues».23 Moreover, today it is not unusual to find «accrédita-
tion» privately administered. The occupational qualification of the 
Ph.D. for a psychologist or university professor or the required eligi-
bility for membership in the vast number of paramédical occupational 
23
 See FRIEDSON, Profession of Medicine (1970) p. 74. 
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associations imposed by hospital hiring are illustrative of this phenom-
enon.24 
This point takes on even greater significance when regard is given 
to the fact that the explosion of knowledge in modem society has 
caused the development of a great number of very sophisticated occupa-
tions that meet ail the characteristics of «salaried professionalism». 
This being so, it appears unfair to grant a spécial status to only the 
prototype professions. Many occupations are now based on systematic 
knowledge or doctrine acquired through long prescribed training and 
more often than not those performing such work adhère to a set of 
moral norms where such norms are relevant.25 Obvious examples in-
clude scientists, dietitians, occupational and speech therapists, social 
workers, psychologists, economists, nurses, mathematicians and profes-
sors. Is each group expected to lobby for spécial treatment and would 
spécial treatment along craft lines be practical ? 
The Canada Labour Code and the Maniîoba Labour Relations Act 
hâve attempted to meet this problem by using a more comprehensive 
professional employée définition, but by limiting the term to those oc-
cupations having a professional organization that is authorized by statute 
to establish the qualifications for membership in the organization they 
continue to rely upon an unduly restrictive if not irrelevant condition. 
Another problem is their mutual requirement that a professional em-
ployée must apply specialized knowledge acquired by a course of in-
struction resulting in graduation from a university or similar institution. 
In a labour relations context, should a university degree be such a 
crucial factor in separating professional employées from other workers ? 
For example, many technologists in the fields of health, science an 
communications are graduâtes of post-secondary institutions other than 
universities, i.e. community collèges, institutes. Would they corne with-
in the phrase « similar institution » and should they be so characterized 
as a matter of policy? Many of thèse occupations possess codes of 
ethics and their associations often play a vital rôle in developing the 
curriculum by which members are educated. Moreover, some of thèse 
associations are supported or referred to by private and public statu-
tes.26 
24
 See HALL, The Paramédical Occupations in Ontario: A Study for the Com-
mittee on the Healing Arts (1970); Report of the Committee on the Healing Arts (1970) 
v. 2. 
25
 Thèse are the two basic criteria of distinction suggested by WILENSKY, 
The Professionalization of Everyone (1964) 60 Am. J. of Soc. 137 at p. 139. 
26
 For example, The Radiological Technicians Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 399, and see 
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It is also important to bear in mind that in an area as dynamic 
as occupational change, many of thèse occupations are in an evolution-
ary state. A community collège program today may be the basis of a 
university degree tomorrow. For example, in the United States, lab-
oratory technologists are trained in universities whereas in Ontario they 
are educated in community collèges. Indeed it can be asked whether 
the différence between a community collège éducation and a Bachelors 
program is any more significant than the educational distance between 
a B.A. (the dietitian), a M.A. (the social worker), and a Ph.D. (the psy-
chologist). In fact some graduâtes of community collèges, like nurses, 
hâve achieved a substantial degree of «professional» récognition. 
Another point to be made is that educational requirements are 
capable of manipulation by an occupation « on the make » and whether 
or not an occupation is engaged in such déception, educational re-
quirements may not reflect the actual skill exercised in the workplace. 
While it is easy to identify différent levels of éducation, as a gênerai 
matter, it is much more difficult to détermine whether the work per-
formed by one occupation is any more difficult or deserving of spécial 
treatment than another. Who is to say that a physiotherapist perforais 
a more complex function than a respiratory technologist although their 
levels of educational attainment are clearly distinct? On the other hand 
a lack of distinction in job duties may be the very reason why the 
salaried professional wishes to engage in collective bargaining, i.e. the 
continued conflict between engineers and engineering technicians.27 
The most prominent législative attempt to avoid an overly restric-
tive définition of professional employée and to accommodate thèse 
problems is section 2(12) of The National Labour Relations Act28 in 
the United States. This section defines professional employée to mean: 
(a) any employée engaged in work (i) predominantly intellectual and varied 
in character as opposed to routine mental, manual, mechanical, or 
physical work ; (ii) involving the consistent exercise of discrétion and 
judgment in its performance ; (iii) of such a character that the attempt 
produced or the resuit accomplished cannot be standardized in relation 
to a given period of time; (iv) requiring knowledge of an advanced 
generally Elizabeth MACNAB,,4 Légal History of Health Professions in Ontario, a study 
for The Committee on the Healing Arts (1970). See also Ontario Public Service Employées 
Union and Stratford General Hospital and Association of Allied Health Professionals 
(1976)OLRBRep. 459. 
27
 See Association of Engineers of Bell Canada and Bell Canada, Montréal, 
Québec (1976) 1 Canadian L.R.B.R. 345 where a lack of distinction in job duties deprived 
a group of engineers of professional status under the Canada Labour Code. 
28
 49 Stat. 449 as amended by 61 Stat. 136 and 73 Stat. 519, 29 U.S.C.A. s. 141 
et seg (amended). 
196 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 32, NO 2 
type in a field of science or learning customarily acquired by a prolongée 
course of specialized intellectual instruction and study in an institution 
of higher learning or a hospital, as distinguished from a gênerai 
académie éducation or from an apprenticeship or from training in the 
performance of routine mental, manual, or physical processes; 
(b) any employée who (i) has completed the courses of specialized intel-
lectual instruction and study described in clause (iv) of paragraph (a) 
and (ii) is performing related work under the supervision of a profes-
sional person to qualify himself to become a professional employée as 
defined in paragraph (a). 
This définition appears much less restrictive than its Canadian counter-
parts and provides the National Labour Relations Board with a greater 
capacity to respond to the claims of ail intellectual workers. I might also 
add that the définition appears most consistent with the dynamics of 
occupational change. 
The Appropriateness of Craft Status 
The issue of craft status as opposed to some form of broader 
based bargaining unit structure is a very important one. The principle 
of craft unionism is maintained when bargaining units are confined to 
members of a single profession or to specialized catégories within a 
profession. The alternative, sometimes referred to as industrial union-
ism, combines two or more professional groups or professional and non-
professional employées. As we hâve seen, those jurisdictions that hâve 
granted salaried professionals access to collective bargaining laws of 
gênerai application hâve not adopted a common formula in this regard. 
Ontario and New Brunswick hâve granted craft status to one or 
more of the prototype professions while leaving the evolving or « new » 
professions to the discrétion of a labour relations board. (An excep-
tion is New Brunswick's treatment of dietitians). As mentioned, the 
difficulty with this approach is that the prototype professions are thereby 
treated différent from other intellectual workers who cannot be signif-
icantly distinguished on the basis of skill, training and responsibility. On 
the other hand, if ail thèse occupations were granted craft status it 
would mean an impossible prolifération of bargaining units in many 
instances. For example, consider the effect on hospital labour relations 
if pharmacists, physiotherapists, occupational therapists, speech ther-
apists, social workers, psychologists, psychometrists, laboratory tech-
nologists, x-ray technologists, respiratory technologists, nuclear medi-
cine technologists, dietitians and médical record librarians were prov-
ided with separate bargaining units. Fragmentation on this order would 
only aggravate counter-productive professional rivalries that already 
exist (and that tend to veto each other in any event) and meaningful 
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negotiation would likely be impaired. In fact, it is more than interest-
ing to note that where, as in the construction industry, this fragmented 
approach was adopted, governments are now gradually moving toward 
more integrated forms of bargaining and collective agreement admin-
istration.29 
British Columbia, Saskatchewan, and the earlier P.C. 1003 rep-
resent a second approach to this problem. This alternative makes no 
mention of professional exclusions and grants no statutory guarantee 
of craft status for any intellectual worker. It leaves the treatment of 
such occupations to the discrétion of the labour relations tribunal 
administering the statute, presumably to be dealt with by référence to 
gênerai labour law principles that hâve evolved over the years in 
defining the «appropriate bargaining unit».30 Unfortunately, however, 
professionals did not fare very well at the hands of the Canada Wartime 
Labour Relations Board and this expérience raises questions about 
the capacity of existing tripartite tribunals to recognize the distinctive 
interests of intellectual workers. Few, if any, of thèse tribunals include 
représentation from the occupations with which this essay is concerned 
and as we hâve seen it is ail too easy to characterize the claims of 
professionals for separateness as elitist and snobbish. Without their own 
représentation on labour boards, intellectual workers may therefore 
find bargaining unit déterminations unduly preoccupied by fears of work 
force fragmentation and concerns for the organizational structure of the 
employer. Accordingly, without building in sufficient institutional sensi-
tivity to the reasons why salaried professionals wish to engage in col-
lective bargaining, this approach may not be very helpful to them. 
The provisions found in the National Labour Relations Act 
(NLRA) and the Canada Labour Code represent a mid-point between 
thèse two alternatives. Section 9 (b) (1) of the NLRA provides that 
the National Labour Relations Board may not group professional em-
29
 See Province of Ontario, Report of the Industrial Inquiry Commission into 
Bargaining Patterns in the Construction Industry, May 1976; First Report, Spécial Com-
mission of Inquiry into British Columbia Construction, October 1975. However this is 
not to deny that the viable protection of craft interests is to a signifîcant extent a fonc-
tion of bargaining unit size and large numbers of salaried professionals employed within 
a single bureaucracy, as is the case with nurses and teachers, may make it feasible to 
respect professional distinctions. But unless a spécial statute is enacted for spécifie in-
dustries or institutions, it is difficult to draft statutory language that can guarantee this 
right and yet provide the flexibility needed to deal with less monolithic work forces. 
30
 Thèse principles are summarized in Usarco Ltd. (1967) OLRB Report Sept, 
p. 526 and Essez Health Assoc. (1967) OLRB Report Nov. p. 716. 
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ployees and non-professionals in a single bargaining unit unless the 
majority of the professional employées vote for inclusion in such a unit. 
This section has been interpreted to mean that while the Board is 
required to differentiate professionals from non-professionals for bar-
gaining unit purposes (remember the NLRA's expansive définition of 
a professional employée) it is not required to differentiate between 
professionals. However, applying its gênerai principles of appropriate-
ness, the Board has held that professional bargaining units should be 
confined to professionals having a community of interests.31 This ap-
proach therefore precludes the Canada Wartime Labour Board type of 
décision and yet provides a tribunal with the flexibility required to tailor 
bargaining units to the diverse circumstances under which salaried pro-
fessionals work. 
The Canada Labour Code contains much more spécifie language 
dealing with two prominent work force situations that hâve caused 
difficulties in the salaried professional context — (1) a large number 
of persons with différent professional backgrounds working side by 
side ; and (2) the interdependence often found between salaried profes-
sionals and so-called para or non-professionals (i.e. the engineer and 
the engineering technician). By conditioning the grant of a craft-like 
bargaining unit by référence to thèse two situations, the législative 
draftsman has tried to create a presumption in favour of craft bargain-
ing and at the same time provide a more limited flexibility than that 
possessed by the National Labour Relations Board. Whether he has 
been successful or not still remains to be seen.32 
CONCLUSION 
The earliest debates on this topic centered on whether salaried 
professionals should be permitted to engage in collective bargaining. 
Many argued that it was «unprofessional» to belong to a trade union 
or that the collective bargaining process, centering on money, would 
undermine the professional status of those who engaged in it. But for 
31
 See for example Standard OU (1954), 107 N.L.R.B. 1524 and Ryan Aeronau-
tical Company (1961), 132 N.L.R.B. 1160. 
32
 In the récent Bell Canada décision (supra) the Board doubted that it could 
limit the application of section 125 (3) (c) to only those situations where the non-profes-
sionals would not outnumber the professionals. And in the Professional Engineers case 
(supra) the Manitoba Board refused to include engineers who were not employed in a 
professional capacity. 
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the large part, thèse arguments hâve been overcome. It is now generally 
understood that salaried professionals hâve turned to collective bargain-
ing for many of the same reasons as other employées, indeed for many 
of the same reasons their non-salaried colleagues established profes-
sional associations and sought licencing statutes.33 There is therefore 
nothing «unprofessional» about collective bargaining. In fact, it is 
through collective bargaining that an accomodation of the often conflict-
ing cultures of professionalism and a bureaucracy may be achieved. 
Through the collective bargaining process professionals can achieve a 
greater say in the decision-making processes of the enterprise ; working 
conditions more consistent with professional standards ; as well as salary 
scales that attract and retain highly qualified members of the profession 
to salaried positions. 
Today then the debate centers not so much on whether salaried 
professionals should be allowed to engage in collective bargaining but 
rather how should such rights be accommodated and hère I suggest 
the response has been unduly narrow. The overwhelming reliance on 
such indicators as the existence of licencing statutes and university 
degrees ignores the dramatic growth of other intellectual occupations 
that do not enjoy one or both of thèse attributes and yet merit the 
désignation «professional». 
I accept that not ail occupations requiring some form of post-
secondary training can be considered to be professional occupations. 
Lines of démarcation must be drawn even though they are somewhat 
arbitrary at the boundary. But in drawing them regard must be had to 
the dynamics of occupational change and, once drawn, labour boards 
ought to be able to group différent «professionals» where a broad com-
munity of interest exists or where bargaining unit fragmentation would 
make labour relations chaotic. However sight must never be lost of the 
fact that intellectual workers who can be considered to be professional 
employées hâve, as a group, a community of interest deserving of 
spécial treatment and preferably along the lines adopted in the United 
States in my opinion. Too often their interests hâve been resented or 
misunderstood by both their fellow employées and their employers and 
labour relations boards, without direction, hâve not always been suf-
ficiently sensitive to their central needs. 
33
 Indeed some might suggest that ethics are merely a form of collective bargain-
ing at the professional level. 
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La négociation collective chez les professionnels 
Plusieurs innovations législatives récentes des législateurs canadiens reconnais-
sent que les membres de nombreuses professions libérales doivent affronter les mêmes 
forces sociales et économiques que la masse des travailleurs salariés. C'est le cas des ar-
chitectes, des dentistes, des avocats, des médecins et des ingénieurs professionnels. Ces 
innovations ont accordé aux membres salariés de l'une ou de plusieurs de ces profes-
sions l'accès à la négociation collective, et en ce faisant elles décidaient que ces profes-
sionnels devaient faire partie d'unités de négociation spéciales. 
Parce que les forces qui ont poussé les professionnels salariés à se tourner vers 
la négociation collective s'accélèrent, d'autres gouvernements devront s'engager dans 
la même voie et nombre des régimes déjà existants prendre une plus grande extension. 
Le nombre de salariés professionnels s'accroit sans cesse sinon d'une façon drama-
tique, et les grandes institutions bureaucratiques où ils trouvent à s'embaucher ne 
s'adaptent pas volontiers aux valeurs du professionalisme. De plus, les associations pro-
fessionnelles n'ont pas été en mesure de trouver des solutions valables aux problèmes 
qui se posent aux professionnels en tant que titulaires d'emplois n'offrant guère d'autres 
mesures à substituer au régime de la négociation collective. Donc, alors que, au cours 
des premières discussions, on se demandait si l'on devait permettre aux professionnels 
salariés de négocier collectivement, on en est graduellement venu à comprendre qu'ils 
devaient avoir le droit de le faire pour les mêmes motifs que les autres employés, à 
vrai dire pour les mêmes motifs que leurs collègues indépendants ont fondé leurs asso-
ciations professionnelles et ont défendu leur droit d'exercice de leur profession. La né-
gociation collective peut canaliser leurs réclamations en matière de contrôle des em-
plois, d'établissement d'échelles de salaire «professionnel» et de meilleures conditions de 
travail. En fait, c'est au moyen de la négociation collective qu'il est possible d'arriver 
à concilier les cultures souvent en conflit du professionnalisme et de la bureaucratie. 
Cependant, de nouvelles questions ont été soulevées. Les intérêts des profes-
sionnels salariés à leur travail sont comparables à ceux d'un nombre de plus en plus 
grand de travailleurs intellectuels. Ce nombre croissant de travailleurs intellectuels ainsi 
que leur «professionnalisation» remet en question l'à-propos, en fait la justification de 
mettre à part les membres salariés des professions-type quant à la façon de considérer 
leur statut spécial de négociation collective. Par exemple, en Ontario et au Nouveau-
Brunswick, la législation concernant la négociation collective ne s'applique qu'aux sa-
lariés membres de professions données où l'on accrédite des unités de négociation pro-
fessionnelle, c'est-à-dire des unités de négociation restreintes à une seule profession. Ceci 
oblige à se demander si l'accréditation par profession est une politique souhaitable et si 
les législateurs et les commissions de relations de travail n'auront pas à faire face à des 
réclamations dans le même sens des membres d'autres occupations intellectuelles qui pos-
sèdent pour la plupart, sinon toutes, la forte empreinte du professionnalisme. 
Il est évident qu'une pareille attitude de la part des travailleurs intellectuels con-
duisait à une fragmentation inapplicable de la structure des unités de négociation. Mais 
s'ensuit-il qu'on ne doive accorder aucune considération particulière à une occupation 
intellectuelle qu'elle appartienne ou non à une profession type comme c'est le cas en 
Colombie-Britannique et en Saskatchewan? On a fait un effort véritable pour résoudre 
ces problèmes dans le Code canadien du travail et dans la Loi des relations de travail 
du Manitoba, qui contiennent, l'un et l'autre, une définition générale de l'employé profes-
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sionnel, et le Code canadien prévoit une façon vraiment nouvelle de fixer les unités de 
négociation des professionnels salariés. Toutefois, le critère exclusif de l'existence de droit 
de pratique et de brevets universitaires ne tient pas compte de la croissance de l'accroisse-
ment dramatique d'autres occupations intellectuelles qui ne bénéficient pas de l'un ou de 
l'autre de ces attributs mais méritent tout autant une désignation professionnelle. 
D'autre part, cela ne veut pas dire que toutes les occupations de cols blancs 
exigeant un certain type de formation post-secondaire devraient être considérées comme 
des professionnels salariés. Il faut tirer des lignes de démarcation même si elles peuvent 
être à la limite arbitraires. Mais en le faisant, on devrait apporter une attention sérieuse 
aux changements qui se produisent dans les types d'emplois. Une fois tirées ces lignes, 
les commissions des relations du travail devraient avoir le pouvoir de regrouper diffé-
rents groupes de professionnels salariés qui possèdent une certaine communauté d'in-
térêts dans une seule unité de négociation. Le National Labour Board aux États-Unis 
fournit un excellent exemple de cette approche qui tient compte de l'ensemble de ces 
considérations. 
Enfin, quelle que soit l'approche spécifique que l'on choisisse, certaines considéra-
tions spéciales s'imposent. Le fait qu'un groupe de travailleurs intellectuels possède une 
communauté d'intérêts a souvent été une chose ignorée par leurs employeurs, mal com-
prise par leurs compagnons de travail et négligée par les commissions des relations de tra-
vail. Pour ces motifs, l'attention qu'ont portée le gouvernement canadien et celui du 
Manitoba aux professionnels salariés constitue un progrès bienvenu. 
LES RELATIONS DU TRAVAIL AU QUÉBEC 
La dynamique du système 
Introduction, Jean BERNIER, Rodrigue BLOUIN, Gilles LAFLAMME, Alain 
LAROCQUE — Où s'en va notre système de relations du travail?, Jean BERNIER 
— L'injonction en relations du travail: recours inapproprié ou abusif?, Henri 
GRONDIN — Commentaires, Jean BEAU VAIS, Philip CUTLER — Méditations 
politiques, commissions parlementaires et lois spéciales: nouveaux modes de 
gestion des conflits?, Fernand MORIN — Interventions accrues du judiciaire et 
du politique: leur signification pour les partenaires sociaux, Marcel PEPIN, 
Ghislain DU FOUR, Jean BOIVIN — Y a-t-il encore place dans notre système de 
relations du travail pour l'arbitrage des différends?, Rodrigue BLOUIN — La 
détermination des services essentiels: un préalable nécessaire à l'exercice du droit 
de grève?, René LAPERRIÈRE — Commentaires, Léo ROBACK, Douglas 
MCDONALD — Le fonctionnement de notre système de relations du travail peut-
il encore reposer sur la volonté des parties?, Claude RYAN — Commentaires, 
Paul-Gaston TREMBLAY, Fernand D'AOUST — La paix industrielle: une 
utopie?, Léon DION. 
1 volume, 229 pages — Prix: $9.00 
LES PRESSES DE L'UNIVERSITÉ LAVAL 
Cité universitaire Québec, P.Q., Canada G1K 7R4 
